In natural situations, movements are often directed toward locations different from that of the evoking sensory stimulus. Movement goals must then be inferred from the sensory cue based on rules. When there is uncertainty about the rule that applies for a given cue, planning a movement involves both choosing the relevant rule and computing the movement goal based on that rule. Under these conditions, it is not clear whether primates compute multiple movement goals based on all possible rules before choosing an action, or whether they first choose a rule and then only represent the movement goal associated with that rule. Supporting the former hypothesis, we show that neurons in the frontoparietal reach areas of monkeys simultaneously represent two different rule-based movement goals, which are biased by the monkeys' choice preferences. Apparently, primates choose between multiple behavioral options by weighing against each other the movement goals associated with each option.
In natural situations, movements are often directed toward locations different from that of the evoking sensory stimulus. Movement goals must then be inferred from the sensory cue based on rules. When there is uncertainty about the rule that applies for a given cue, planning a movement involves both choosing the relevant rule and computing the movement goal based on that rule. Under these conditions, it is not clear whether primates compute multiple movement goals based on all possible rules before choosing an action, or whether they first choose a rule and then only represent the movement goal associated with that rule. Supporting the former hypothesis, we show that neurons in the frontoparietal reach areas of monkeys simultaneously represent two different rule-based movement goals, which are biased by the monkeys' choice preferences. Apparently, primates choose between multiple behavioral options by weighing against each other the movement goals associated with each option.
INTRODUCTION
When passing the ball to a player of his team, a soccer player can identify and select the proper target among many potential targets by the color of the jerseys. In this situation the physical targets are identical to potential targets of action (Figure 1A, left) . However, when a striker is approaching the opponent goal, multiple alternative action goals have to be inferred from a single physical target (the goal keeper) via spatial transformation rules ( Figure 1A , right). The striker might want to aim for the goal keeper, speculating that he or she will jump away, or for the opposite corner of the goal, hoping that the keeper stays. Recently, a lot has been learned on how primates represent and decide between multiple physical targets in target-selection tasks, and how different frontal and parietal cortical areas contribute to target valuation and selection (Sugrue et al., 2005; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Churchland et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Andersen and Cui, 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Kim and Basso, 2010; Bisley and Goldberg, 2010; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) . Little is known, however, about decision processes in rule-selection tasks, which require choosing among goals based on a spatial transformation rule (Tremblay et al., 2002) , and in which alternative goals might not be physically present as target stimuli, but have to be spatially inferred, like in the example of the striker.
In rule-selection experiments, alternative movements are conducted under identical spatial sensory conditions, but according to different context-defined transformation rules (Wise et al., 1996; Wallis and Miller, 2003) . In antisaccade or antireach tasks ( Figure 1A , right) a single visuospatial input is associated with two alternative movement goals: one that is directly cued by the sensory input (aim at the keeper), and another that has to be inferred from a spatial cue by applying a remapping rule (aim at the corner of the soccer goal opposite to the keeper) (Crammond and Kalaska, 1994; Shen and Alexander, 1997; Schlag-Rey et al., 1997; Everling et al., 1999; Zhang and Barash, 2004; Medendorp et al., 2005; Gail and Andersen, 2006) . Two alternative decision processes are conceivable in such ruleselection tasks. The sensorimotor system could first choose among the alternative rules, and then only compute one sensorimotor transformation to encode the single motor goal that is associated with the selected rule (rule-selection hypothesis). Alternatively, the system could first compute all potential sensorimotor transformations, and then select among the multiple resulting motor-goal options (goal-selection hypothesis).
The difference between the rule-and goal-selection hypotheses should become obvious in areas of the brain that have ''spatial competence'' for movement planning, i.e., areas that exhibit spatially selective neural encoding of motor goal information. This is the case, for example, in the premotor cortex (Weinrich and Wise, 1982; Snyder et al., 1997; Crammond and Kalaska, 2000) and the posterior parietal cortex (Mountcastle et al., 1975; Snyder et al., 1997; Batista et al., 1999; Gail and Andersen, 2006) . The rule-selection hypothesis predicts that such areas only encode one goal at a time, according to the preliminarily selected rule, but not multiple rule-based potential goals simultaneously (Figure 1B, left) . The goal-selection hypothesis predicts that they simultaneously encode all alternative potential movement goals prior to the decision ( Figure 1B, right) . Therefore, the two hypotheses are distinguishable only at predecision stages, where the simultaneous existence of multiple, alternative, potential motor goals in a rule-selection task would favor the goal-selection hypothesis.
Evidence for potential motor goal encoding in spatial rule selection tasks, i.e., in situations like in the example of the striker, is lacking. Several areas of the brain have been thought to encode multiple potential motor goals in space, but only in experiments involving selection among multiple physical targets (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2008) . However, in such tasks, multiple alternative spatial representations in the neural activity could be associated with multiple physical targets rather than motor goals. Therefore, target selection tasks are unsuitable for distin-A B Figure 1 . Target-Selection versus RuleSelection Task (A) In a target-selection task (left) two distinguishable (e.g. colored) spatial cues (targets) are presented, of which one should be chosen as movement goal according to a selection rule. Both potential targets have been spatially specified before the selection. In our rule-selection task only one spatial cue is provided, while the goal of the movement can be the position of the spatial cue (direct rule) or diametrically opposite to it (inferred rule). (B) Neural rule-or goal-selection encoding in a rule-selection task. Decisions in ambiguous ruleselection tasks might follow a ''rule selection'' hypothesis (left columns). The rule will first be selected, and then be applied to the spatial cue to compute the single associated spatial motor goal. In spatial planning areas there will be either no spatial information encoded (solid red), or a memory of the spatial cue location (dotted orange) prior to the final selection. The ''motor-goal selection'' hypothesis (right columns) states that both alternative rules are applied to the spatial cue to create two competing spatial representations for the direct and the inferred motor goal, which may (dotted orange) or may not (solid red) be modulated by choice preferences of the subject. Note that the initial spatial encoding during the spatial cue presentation and the postdecision encoding of the final motor goal are identical in both hypotheses.
Figure 2. Rule-Selection Task with Instructed Delay
In our potential motor-goal (PMG) task a single spatial cue was presented at one of the four cardinal directions prior to a memory period. 60%-80% of the trials were context-instruction trials (PMG-CI) in which a contextual cue was shown in a second cue period (''GO''). This contextual cue instructed a direct reach toward the position of the preceding spatial cue (green) or an inferred reach toward the diametrically opposite direction (blue). In 20%-40% of the trials no contextual cue was shown (PMG-NC), and the monkeys were free to choose the goal either according to the direct or inferred transformation rule.
guishing between the rule-and the goalselection hypotheses. We measured the spatial selectivity of neurons in monkey parietal and premotor cortex during reach planning in a novel rule-selection task (Figure 2 ). We show that two spatial, rule-based potential motor goals can be simultaneously encoded, supporting the goal-selection hypothesis.
Potential motor goals can encode all alternative choices as defined by the task (options), or biased representations of all choices based on previous reward experience (preferences), depending on which stage of the decision process they represent. So far, empirical evidence for preference encoding has been lacking for skeletomotor tasks, even in target selection experiments. Many previous oculomotor studies showed modulation of neural target responses by choice probability or some form of value assignment (preference encoding) in different brain areas of monkey (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Dorris and Munoz, 1998; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Kim and Basso, 2010; Louie and Glimcher, 2010) and human (Hampton et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Yanai et al., 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2009) . Target-selection experiments using skeletomotor behavior, like reaching, showed encoding of freely selected targets in the parietal reach region (PRR) (Scherberger and Andersen, 2007; Pesaran et al., 2008) , and potential motor goal encoding in the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) of monkeys (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) , but the task designs in these studies did not allow dissociation of option versus preference encoding. We tested for the encoding of options versus preferences by using a mixture of instructed and free-choice trials in combination with different probabilistic reward schemes. We show that potential motor goal signals in monkey parietal and premotor cortex during reach planning represent mostly choice preferences, rather than options or preliminary selections.
RESULTS

Balanced Choices between Alternative Rule-Based Motor Goals
To distinguish between the rule-and goal-selection hypotheses we first tested if two potential rule-based motor goals can be encoded simultaneously, since this would provide evidence for the goal-selection hypothesis ( Figure 1B , right). We designed a potential motor goal (PMG) task, in which subjects had to choose between two rule-based motor goals in each trial, and characterized the spatial selectivity of neural activity as a function of the spatial motor goal(s) during ambiguous reach planning.
Two male rhesus monkeys were trained to perform a memoryguided antireach task with instructed delay (Figure 2) . A single spatial cue was combined with an optional contextual color cue. The contextual cue defined one of two spatial transformation rules according to which the spatial cue had to be mapped onto the associated motor goal. The reach goal could either be identical to the spatial cue (direct reach) or opposite to it (inferred reach). In each trial of this PMG task, both options were available in parallel to the subjects during reach planning, since the contextual cue was presented only at the end of the instructed delay, while the spatial cue was presented prior to the delay.
The PMG task consisted of two randomly interleaved trial types, either with context instruction at the end of the delay period (PMG-CI, 60%-80%), or without context instruction (no context, PMG-NC, 20%-40%). We used the ''free-choice'' PMG-NC trials to probe the subjects' behavioral choice preferences, and manipulated the subject's choice preferences by varying the reward schedules (see below).
The performance in PMG-CI trials was high for both monkeys (PMG-CI: 88 ± 1% [monkey A], 80 ± 1.4% [monkey S]). Most errors could be attributed to ocular fixation breaks, while improper choices in instructed trials, i.e., confusions of the direct and inferred reach goal, were rare in both monkeys (<2%). In the PMG-NC trials, both direct-and inferred-goal choices with proper ocular fixation and timing were considered correct, while reaches to any other directions were considered incorrect. In the first data set we are going to present, correct PMG-NC trials were rewarded according to a bias minimizing reward schedule (BMRS).
The BMRS was designed to reinforce balanced choice behavior, by taking the reward history of the monkey into account and reducing the reward probability if the behavior was biased. In the BMRS, random behavior with an equal amount of choices for either motor goal (on a short-term average across few trials) leads to 50% reward probability, while any consistent bias in choices leads to lower reward probabilities (see Experimental Procedures). With the BMRS, the direct choices (40 ± 0.1%, monkey A; 39.4 ± 2.5%, monkey S) and inferred choices (48.7 ± 0.1%, monkey A; 44.9 ± 2.6%, monkey S) were mostly balanced, with only a small bias in favor of inferred choices ( Figure 3A ). The overall balance between direct and inferred reach choices in PMG-NC trials suggests that the monkeys had close-to-equal preference for the two potential motor goals in BMRS sessions (= balanced data set).
Rule Selection versus Goal Selection-Potential Motor Goal Encoding
According to the goal-selection hypothesis, the planning of two equipotent alternative actions should lead to the neural encoding of both corresponding motor goal representations simultaneously. According to the rule-selection hypothesis, we would have to expect only one motor goal representation at a time despite balanced behavioral choices on average ( Figure 1B) [S] ) fulfilled the criteria to be tested for the encoding of potential motor goals (see Experimental Procedures). For the purpose of separating the rule-selection from the goal-selection hypothesis PMG-CI and PMG-NC trials were analyzed jointly, since the trial types are indistinguishable and unpredictable to the subjects prior to the optional contextual cue at the time of the GO signal. Figure 3B shows an example neuron from PRR with a bimodal spatial selectivity profile from the balanced data set in the PMG task. We first tested the neurons spatial selectivity in two reference conditions. In the definite motor goal (DMG) task the monkeys were unambiguously instructed about the pending motor goal prior to memory period, i.e., the spatial and the contextual cue were shown at the beginning of the memory period (see Experimental Procedures). During such unambiguous planning in the DMG task, the neuron's responses reflected the unique downward motor goal in the ''direct'' (Figure 3B, left) and ''inferred'' (Figure 3B, center) context. This is indicated by the selectivity profiles for direct and inferred reaches that show the neural response as a function of the cue position, and that are shifted by 180 relative to each other ( Figure 3B , bottom). Such motor-goal selectivity is characteristic for PRR (Gail and Andersen, 2006; Gail et al., 2009) , and common to most directionally selective neurons of the current study (>80% across The average normalized activity of all eligible PRR neurons during the PMG-CI task is shown aligned to the spatial cue onset, the GO signal, and the movement onset (dotted red lines). Selectivity profiles were aligned to the neurons' preferred directions in DMG trials before averaging (PD, preferred direction; OD, opposite-to-preferred direction). Direct-cued and inferred-cued PMG-CI trials physically differ only at the time of the context instruction, hence, data are plotted jointly for the cue and memory periods. The inset shows the distribution of direction modality contrast (DMC) values for all eligible neurons in the late memory period. data sets). Importantly, in the ambiguous PMG task ( Figure 3B , right), the neuron was always most active if the previous spatial cue in a PMG task potentially indicated a downward (270 ) reach, i.e., when it had appeared either at the upper (90 ) or lower (270 ) position. Since the spatial selectivity profile is plotted as a function of cue location, the bimodal activity profile with a peak separation of 180 indicates encoding of a single motor-goal direction in two different cue conditions, not two different motor-goal directions. Notably, the neuron was not active in trials with right-side (0 ) or left-side (180 ) cues, but only for those two directions (up and down) that were equally probable to instruct a downward motor goal.
The bimodal response profile of the example neuron in Figure 3B in the PMG task matched the prediction of the goal-selection hypothesis, and contradicts the rule-selection hypothesis. The bimodal profile mimicked the response pattern one would expect when averaging (not summing) the two response profiles in the DMG task. This means, the response pattern during planning of two equipotent alternative potential motor goals was an equally weighted linear combination of the response patterns during unambiguous planning of the two respective unique motor goals. In a model-based analysis we quantitatively confirmed this view (see Figures S1 and S4 available online).
Bimodal selectivity profiles dominated the balanced data set in PRR. The average population activity in the balanced data set shows two stable ridges of activity during the memory period ( Figure 3C ). Since the cue-position axis marks the location of the spatial cue relative to the preferred direction (PD) of each neuron (as measured in the DMG task), the two ridges indicate that on the population level the direct and inferred goals are represented simultaneously during ambiguous reach planning. For quantitative analysis we characterized the bimodal versus unimodal selectivity of each neuron with a direction modality contrast (DMC). Positive DMC indices indicate selectivity for the direct motor goal; negative values indicate selectivity for the inferred motor goal. Indices close to zero indicate symmetric bimodal tuning (not lack of tuning) since only directionally selective neurons were considered (see Experimental Procedures). The mean DMC of the balanced data set did not significantly deviate from zero (m = 0.001; standard error of the mean [SEM] = 0.021, p > 0.05), indicating that in the balanced data set most neurons had bimodal selectivity profiles ( Figure 3C , inset).
Potential Motor Goals or Preliminary Selections?
Choice-Selective Analysis in PRR The existence of a bimodal neural selectivity pattern in the balanced data set is not sufficient to demonstrate potential motor goal encoding. The monkeys could have preliminarily selected one of the two potential motor goals during the memory period in every trial, and randomly switched their selection from trial to trial. Such switching would be obscured in PMG-CI trials due to the explicit context instruction at the time of the GO cue. The bimodal selectivity pattern revealed by the above analyses would denote an artifact of averaging across inhomogeneous sets of trials in this case ( Figure 4A, bottom) .
With a choice-selective analysis of the free-choice (PMG-NC) trials we can rule out this possibility. We can instead show that both potential motor goals were encoded independently of the monkey's later choices (Figure 4A, top) . If the monkeys made preliminary selections in every trial then this selection should A B
Figure 4. Encoding of Potential Motor Goals versus Preliminary Selections
(A) Schematic description of how to test the two alternative hypotheses with a choice-selective analysis of the free-choice trials (PMG-NC). Bimodal selectivity in the PMG trials could be the result of averaging across trials with alternating preliminary selection of either of the two potential motor goals (lower row), or reflect potential motor-goal encoding proper, independent of the later choice (top row). The similarity of the absolute DMC values, computed separately for direct-choice (green) and inferred-choice (blue) trials, with the choice-indifferent absolute DMC values, computed for all trials, allows to differentiate the two possibilities (see Figure S2 for a control).
(B) Choice-selective versus choice-indifferent absolute DMC values. The difference histogram shows that there is no significant deviation from the unity line, indicating encoding of two potential motor goals, and contradicting preliminary selection encoding.
be reflected in an unambiguous neural encoding of this preliminary selection in the late memory period immediately prior to the monkeys decision (preliminary selection encoding). We sorted PMG-NC trials according to the choice of the monkey, and computed DMC values of the neural activity in the late memory period separately for the trials in which the monkeys freely chose the direct and inferred goals. If the low DMC of a neuron with bimodal selectivity was the averaging result of two opposite unimodal selectivity profiles, one for direct-choice trials and the other for the inferred-choice trials, then a low absolute value of the original DMC would be attended with high absolute values of the two choice-selective DMC values for this neuron. This means, preliminary selection encoding would be indicated by a low similarity between the original and the choice-selective DMC values across neurons ( Figure 4A , bottom). Vice versa, we can reject the selection hypothesis if a neuron in both choice-selective subsets of trials shows a bimodal selectivity pattern, i.e., when low absolute values of the original DMC is attended with low absolute choice-selective DMC values, resulting in a high similarity between original and choice-selective DMC across neurons ( Figure 4A , top). The balanced data set in PRR yielded bimodal selectivity in PMG-NC trials separately within direct-choice and within inferred-choice trials. The absolute choice-selective DMC values for direct-and inferred-choice trials were highly similar to the absolute original DMC values ( Figure 4B ). This can be seen by the fact that the average distance of the data points from the unity line did not significantly differ from zero neither for direct-(p d > 0.05) nor inferred-choice (p i > 0.05) trials. When-as a control-the method was applied to the DMG data set, in which we know that the monkeys had selected the motor goal already during the memory period, then the choice-selective and original DMCs were highly and significantly dissimilar (p d = 0.0012, p i = 0.00067; see Figure S2 ). Additional variance tests indicated that it is unlikely that the bimodal selectivity profiles were the consequence of rapid switching between two alternative preliminary selections within the time of a trial ( Figure S2 ).
Taken together, the results from the choice-selective analysis of the balanced data set indicated genuine encoding of potential motor goals rather than alternating preliminary selections in PRR. This supports the motor-goal selection hypothesis and argues against the rule-selection hypothesis.
Manipulating Behavioral Choice Preferences
Depending on which stage of the decision process a brain area belongs to, encoding of multiple potential motor goals in that area could represent the multiple options offered to the subject (the ''menu''), or the competing behavioral goals associated with these options and weighted with the subject's preference for either choice. Motor-goal options were defined solely by the task. In any PMG trial two motor-goal options (the direct and inferred motor goal) were valid during the memory period. Encoding of motor-goal options should lead to the representations of two potential motor goals during the memory period of all PMG trials, irrespective of any choice preferences of the monkeys. Motor-goal preferences were defined by the monkeys' average choice behavior in PMG-NC trials. Since the monkeys had close-to-equal choice preferences for direct and inferred motor goals in the balanced data set, the bimodal selectivity profiles are not suited to dissociate encoding of motor-goal options versus motor-goal preferences. If, on the other hand, the monkeys had a bias in favor of one of the two options, then encoding of motor-goal preferences should lead to neural activities in the memory period of PMG trials that reflect the relative probability of selecting either potential goal in the PMG-NC trials. By using different reward schedules we recorded two data sets, one with balanced choice behavior (see above), and one with strong behavioral choice bias, to dissociate the options and preference encoding hypotheses.
In the second data set, correct PMG-NC trials were rewarded according to an equal probability reward schedule (EPRS). With the EPRS, in which a 50% reward probability independent of the choice history was guaranteed (reward probability: 52 ± 5%; p > 0.05 [A], 50 ± 4%; p > 0.05 [S]), both monkeys showed a strong bias in favor of the inferred reach goal ( Figure 5A ), i.e., most reaches in PMG-NC trials were directed toward the inferred motor goal (85 ± 4.0% monkey A, 63 ± 4.1% monkey S), and only a small fraction toward the direct goal (2.4 ± 0.8% monkey A, 17.8 ± 3.4% monkey S). In the remaining PMG-NC trials (12.6% monkey A, 19.2% monkey S) the monkeys aborted the trial without reaching, or reached toward one of the orthogonal goals (<1%). This means that both monkeys had a preference for the inferred goal when the transformation rule was unknown, and when either goal selection was rewarded with equal probability in EPRS sessions (= biased data set).
We can only speculate about the reason for the intrinsic bias of both monkeys during the EPRS ( Figure S3 ). The reason behind this behavior is not immediately relevant for the purpose of dissociating options encoding from preference encoding at the neural population level, though. It is sufficient to note that both monkeys consistently had a similarly strong bias over an extended period of time in the EPRS sessions, and little to no bias in the BMRS sessions.
Options versus Preference Encoding in PRR
If neurons encoded behavioral choice preferences then we would expect encoding of only the inferred motor goal in the PMG trials of the biased data set, in contrast to the encoding of both potential motor goals simultaneously as seen in the balanced data set. This should be true in the late memory period of all PMG trials, since PMG-CI trials are indistinguishable from the PMG-NC trials prior to the GO signal, and were randomly interleaved.
In PRR, the biased data set contained a total of 258 ( The PRR example neuron in Figure 5B was recorded in the biased data set and was most active during planning of leftward (180 ) reaches in direct-cued or inferred-cued DMG trials. In PMG trials the neuron was only highly active if the spatial cue was presented at the right side (0 ), i.e., as if an inferred instruction had been given externally or had been selected internally. Such unimodal selectivity for the inferred goal dominated the biased data set in PRR. The average normalized population activity showed only a brief response increase when the cue matched the preferred direction (PD) of the neurons. This was followed by a high level of activity when the cue was opposite to the PD, corresponding to an encoding of the inferred goal throughout the memory period ( Figure 5C ). The mean DMC during the memory period of the biased data set was negative (m = À0.31; SEM = 0.028) and significantly different from zero (rank-sum test, p < 0.001) ( Figure 5C, inset) . This means that the behavioral preference was reflected in a significant bias of 
Figure 5. Neural Encoding of Motor Goal Preference in a Data Set with Biased Choice Behavior
(A) Biased percentage of direct (green) and inferred (blue) choices in PMG-NC trials with an equal probability reward schedule (EPRS). Same conventions apply as in Figure 3. (B) Example PRR neuron from the biased data set. It showed motor-goal selectivity in the DMG task, as did the example in Figure 3 . But in the PMG task it is only active if the spatial cue appears opposite to the neurons PD.
(C) Correspondingly, PRR population activity shows a strong representation at the opposite-to-cue position (OD) during the memory period. The DMC distribution is significantly biased for the inferred goal (mean DMC = À0.31; ***p < 0.001; rank-sum test).
the neural directional selectivity in the population of PRR neurons. The inferred-goal neural preference is neither consistent with an unbiased equipotent encoding of the two taskdefined motor goal options (options hypothesis), nor with an encoding of the previous instruction cue (visual memory), but it is consistent with the preference hypothesis. Based on the observed inferred-goal selectivity in the biased data set alone, one could not dissociate preference encoding from preliminary selection encoding. But we can argue against the latter possibility based on the choice-independent bimodal response profiles in the choice-selective analysis of the balanced data set. Preliminary selection encoding would have had to reveal direct-goal neural selectivity in direct-choice trials, and inferred-goal selectivity in inferred-choice trials, which was not the case (see above).
Motor-Goal Encoding in Dorsal Premotor Cortex (PMd)
Another objective of our study was to compare parietal and premotor sensorimotor areas, which are well known to be involved in reach planning, while their role in reaching decisions is less clear (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005; Scherberger and Andersen, 2007) . We conducted the same analyses for PMd as for PRR neurons. The biased data set contained 193 PMd neurons (118 monkey A, 75 monkey S), and the balanced data set 112 PMd neurons (monkey S). Of those, 46% fulfilled the criteria for the DMC analysis in the biased data set, and 40% in the balanced data set, which denote smaller fractions of neurons than in PRR (see above).
The analyses of potential motor-goal encoding in PMd revealed overall very similar results to PRR, but there were also differences. The distribution of DMC values in the biased data set of PMd ( Figure 6B ) revealed a significant bias in favor of the inferred motor goal (m = À0.298; SEM = 0.038, p < 10 À10 , t test), as it was the case in PRR ( Figure 5C , inset). In contrast to PRR ( Figure 3C , inset), the DMC distribution in PMd ( Figure 6A ) also showed a significant remaining bias for inferred goals (m = À0.11; SEM = 0.05, p = 0.004) in the balanced data set. Note, though, that this bias in DMC values was significantly smaller (p = 0.002) than in the biased data set, which indicates that most neurons exhibited bimodal response profiles, while few had a weak bias for the inferred goal. Since the monkeys also had a small residual choice preference for the inferred goal ( Figure 3A ) this could mean that PMd is more strongly modulated by small choice preferences than PRR. The choiceselective analyses of the PMG-NC trials showed a high DMC similarity ( Figure 6C ), equivalent to PRR ( Figure 4B ). This, like in PRR, indicated that the bimodal directional selectivity was mostly not the consequence of preliminary selection encoding in combination with trial-by-trial switching of the behavioral choice. In summary, the PMd results are qualitatively very similar to PRR, suggesting similar encoding schemes in both areas. For a discussion of additional smaller differences between PRR and PMd as revealed by our model-based analyses and variance analyses see Figures S1 and S2.
Normalization of Multiple Motor-Goal Representations
Models of decision making often involve mutual competition between the neural representations of multiple coexisting alternative choices (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Cisek, 2006) . Such competition implies that the response of a neuron should be reduced when its preferred motor goal marks only one out of two equally valid behavioral options, compared to when the motor goal is unambiguously selected. The responses of the example neurons and the population activity plots in goal argues in favor of a competition between alternative motor goal representations.
DISCUSSION
The ability to plan multiple upcoming actions and decide among them is vital to an organism acting within a complex environment. We investigated how parietal and premotor reach planning areas encode the decision between different possible sensorimotor transformation rules that could be applied to a single visuospatial object. When monkeys were faced with two alternative spatial transformations, and chose them with equal preference, then two separate spatial motor goal representations coexisted in the frontoparietal reach network. This was the case despite the fact that only one goal was directly visually cued and the other had to be inferred from the visual cue by applying a remapping rule. Additionally, the parietal reach region (PRR) and the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) predominantly encoded the variable choice preference between two potential motor goals. By using free-choice probe trials and two distinct reward schedules, we could rule out encoding of the monkeys' preliminary behavioral selections, as well as encoding of the task-defined choice options, during movement planning. Our results suggest that in rule-selection experiments the sensorimotor system first computes all potential motor goals associated with a currently valid set of potential transformation rules, weighs them according to the subject's choice preference, and then selects among these goals.
Deciding among Alternative Action Plans Rather than Transformation Rules or Targets
We showed that during movement planning two alternative potential reach goals can be represented simultaneously in PRR and PMd in a rule-selection task. In this task only one visuospatial target was presented at a time, allowing two alternative motor goals by applying two different mapping rules. Our results suggest that with preexisting knowledge about the visuospatial constraints of the task (knowing the spatial cue), and uncertainty about the to-be-applied rule (not knowing the context cue), the sensorimotor system constructs all remaining motor goal options, which are defined by the general context of the task, and are of subjective value to the monkey (see biased versus balanced condition below). We can reject the alternative ruleselection hypothesis according to which the monkeys in general would first select a rule, and then only compute the single associated motor plan. It is as if the sensorimotor system in a rule-selection task first creates all potential motor-goal representations and then applies the same computational decision algorithms as in a target-selection task. The view that multiple spatial motor goal options can be simultaneously encoded prior to the decision in parietal and premotor areas is reminiscent of earlier saccadic target-selection experiments in the superior colliculus (Basso and Wurtz, 1998) and the lateral intraparietal area LIP (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Louie and Glimcher, 2010) . They showed probabilistic, graded neural responses for preferred and nonpreferred targets, depending on saccadic choice probabilities or subjective values.
Also, a study in PMd showed bimodal response profiles in a manual two-target selection task (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) . Our conclusions go beyond the previous findings, since these studies showed the coexistence of multiple spatial representations associated with alternative choices, but used target-selection tasks. We show that the simultaneous representation of mutually exclusive spatial motor goals in sensorimotor areas does not require the presentation of multiple alternative spatial physical target stimuli.
This simultaneous encoding of alternative competing motor goals is also fundamentally different from the representation of two sequential movement goals. Previous experiments showed that in the parietal cortex, during the planning of a multicomponent (double-step) movement, two neural populations were activated, each of which was selective for one of the single movement components (Medendorp et al., 2006; Baldauf et al., 2008) . Double-step experiments do not induce a decision process between mutually exclusive action goals, and rather suggest that multiple components of a complex movement can be planned at once. Our finding of simultaneous encoding of alternative competing motor goals does complement previous observations in effector-selection experiments, which showed that alternative eye or hand movements to the same spatial target, instructed (Calton et al., 2002) or freely chosen (Cui and Andersen, 2007) , can elicit simultaneous movement planning activity in LIP and PRR.
The advantage of the goal-selection scheme over the ruleselection scheme for decision making could be that-by computing all associated motor goal alternatives and their implicit action plans during the ambiguous state of planning-a more comprehensive cost-benefit calculation of each choice can be achieved. When the striker in our introductory example has to decide between aiming for the position of the goal keeper versus the opposite corner, then it is not enough to consider the likelihood of the keeper to jump or stay. Also the costs associated with the striker's action alternatives are relevant, e.g., the striker might be poor at aiming for right-side goals, or the ball might be in an immediate position that eases aiming for one corner but not the other. Our results imply that the decision process in our rule-selection experiment selected between competing motor-goal alternatives, not between different transformation rules or target stimuli, and that this competition likely happened in the sensorimotor areas that are involved in planning the respective movements.
Note, we do note rule out the possibility that in parallel a competition between the two potential rules takes place in rule-encoding frontal cortical areas (White and Wise, 1999; Wallis et al., 2001; Wallis and Miller, 2003; Genovesio et al., 2005) . The rule-competition could then, in the extreme case, just be mirrored by probabilistic motor goal representations in downstream sensorimotor areas. Because of the observed response normalization in our data (see below), we believe that if at all there was a rule-competition in our task then it was paralleled by a goal-competition in the sensorimotor areas, which would make sense for economical reasons, as discussed in the previous paragraph (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) .
Preference versus Options Encoding
Potential motor-goal representations in our experiment depended on the preference of the monkeys, as defined by the probability of behavioral choice of either action alternative. In our task design we cannot differentiate between choice probabilities and assigned subjective value (Sugrue et al., 2004; Samejima et al., 2005; Hampton et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2009) , as was attempted in a recent discounting experiment (Louie and Glimcher, 2010) . Consequently, we speak more generally of preferences, as quantified by choice probabilities.
Simultaneous potential motor-goal encoding during reach planning had previously only been shown in PMd (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) . Since a dependence on the monkeys' choice preferences was not tested, it is unclear if this previous PMd data reflected preferences or task-defined motor-goal options (the menu, Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). The biased population tuning in the memory period of our biased data set contradicts options encoding, and suggests that potential motor-goal encoding predominantly reflected choice preferences in PMd.
In posterior parietal cortex, preference encoding between competing options has previously been shown in saccadic target-selection tasks (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2009; Louie and Glimcher, 2010) . Corresponding data for skeletomotor movements, like reaching, and for rule-selection tasks in general is lacking. Previous target-selection tasks with reaching revealed post-GO-cue selection signals in PRR (Scherberger and Andersen, 2007; Pesaran et al., 2008) , but no neural response modulations by choice preference was shown. Previous tasks with deterministic targets showed reward-or value-dependent modulations of the neural responses (Musallam et al., 2004; Iyer et al., 2010) , but relative weighing of alternative options against each other was not tested.
Taken together, the principle of weighing alternative motor goal representations with behavioral choice preferences is not restricted to the saccade planning system, but can be found in the skeletomotor system as well, and neural implementations of this principle include not only parietal movement planning areas, but also areas in the frontal cortex, like PMd.
Competing Goal Representations
Models of decision making often imply mutual competition between the neural representations of multiple coexisting alternative choices (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Cisek, 2006) . In our experiment, this competition likely happened in the sensorimotor areas that we recorded from and that are involved in planning the respective movements, since we found reduced neural response strengths during the simultaneous representation of two alternative motor goals compared to a single goal (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) .
Conclusions
Our findings support the idea that reach decision making and movement planning, in tasks that require the selection of a spatial transformation rule, are integrative rather than sequential processes, mediated by overlapping action-specific neural populations in PRR and PMd (Scherberger and Andersen, 2007; Cisek, 2007; Andersen and Cui, 2009 ). The results provide evidence for competitive encoding of alternative potential reach plans in PRR and PMd, reflecting the monkeys' average choice preferences, but being independent of the immediate behavioral choice of the monkey. This is consistent with the idea that the brain utilizes probabilistic representations throughout all stages of the decision process until an action is finally required (Knill and Pouget, 2004) . Importantly, our results suggest that in situations of uncertain choice of which transformation rule to apply, the sensorimotor system can construct all potential motor goal alternatives, and then select among these alternatives, once enough evidence for a proper choice is available, rather than preliminarily betting on one of the transformation rules and computing only the single corresponding motor plan. This strategy could denote a valuable and general principle in decision making, allowing a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that includes the consequential costs of the movements associated with each choice.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES Potential Motor Goal Task with Context Instruction
In PMG-CI trials (Figure 2 ), one spatial and one contextual visual cue were presented to the subjects at different times during the trial (ViewSonic VX922 LCD screen; 5 ms off-on-off response time). The peripheral spatial cue was located at one of four possible positions (0 , 90 , 180 , and 270 ) with an eccentricity of 9 cm (14.5 visual angle, VA) relative to the fixation point. The contextual cue consisted of a green (direct-cued) or blue (inferred-cued) frame around the central eye and hand fixation points. It instructed the subject to reach toward (direct, proreach) or to the position diametrically opposite of the spatial cue (inferred, antireach). A trial was initiated by the monkey by fixating a small red square in the center of the screen (eye fixation tolerance: 2.0-3.0 VA; 224 Hz CCD camera, ET-49B, Thomas Recording, Giessen, Germany) and touching an adjacent white square of the same size (hand fixation tolerance: 4.0 VA, touch screen mounted directly in front of the video screen; IntelliTouch, ELO Systems, Menlo Park, CA). After a random period of 500-1000 ms (fixation period) the spatial cue was shown briefly for 200 ms. During the following 800-2000 ms (memory period) only the fixation squares were visible. The contextual cue was shown for 170 ms at the end of the memory period and the hand fixation square disappeared (GO signal). The monkey had to make a reach toward the instructed goal within a maximum of 700-1000 ms (movement period, 4.9 VA reach tolerance) and hold the goal position for 300-400 ms (feedback period). The monkey received visual feedback about the correct movement goal (filled circle of the same color as the contextual cue at the goal location) at the end of a correct trial. Eye fixation had to be kept throughout the trial. Liquid reward and acoustic feedback indicated correct (high pitch tone, reward) or incorrect (low pitch tone, no reward) behavior. Correct choice of the instructed motor goal and fixation behavior were required for a PMG-CI trial to be considered correct. Only correct trials were used for the analysis.
Potential Motor Goal Task without Context Information PMG-NC trials were similar to the PMG-CI trials, except that no contextual cue was shown at the end of the memory period. In those trials the monkey had to choose whether to reach to the direct or to the inferred goal. Until the end of the memory period PMG-CI and PMG-NC trials were indistinguishable. Only PMG-NC trials in which the monkey either reached for the direct or the inferred position were considered correct and were used for the analysis. Note that not all of the correct trials were rewarded. Reward depended on the used reward schedule (see below).
Definite Motor Goal Task
The DMG task differed from the PMG-CI trials only in the timing of the contextual cue. In the DMG task the spatial and the contextual cue were shown simultaneously at the beginning of the memory period. Only DMG trials with correct choices and ocular fixation were rewarded and analyzed.
Block Design and Randomization
The PMG and DMG tasks were presented in separate blocks. The DMG block consisted of typically $100 trials, the PMG block of a minimum of $300 trials. The order of the two tasks was variable across days.
PMG-NC and PMG-CI trials were randomly interleaved during PMG blocks. A PMG block contained 60%-80% (mean = 76%) PMG-CI trials and 20%-40% (mean = 24%) PMG-NC trials. In each task the four spatial cuing directions were randomly interleaved with equal probability. In PMG-CI trials and in the DMG task the direct-cued and inferred-cued trials were also randomly interleaved with equal probability.
Reward Schedules in PMG-NC Trials
We implemented two different reward schedules for PMG-NC trials.
One was the bias-minimizing reward schedule (BMRS). With a BMRS balanced behavior, i.e., 50% direct and 50% inferred reaches, leads to a 50% reward probability, while any biased choice behavior leads to lower reward probabilities. The BMRS algorithm takes the reward history of the monkeys into account and changes the probabilities for rewarding a direct or inferred reach in favor of the alternative that was chosen less often so far:
where n i is the total number of rewarded inferred reaches and n d is the total number of rewarded direct reaches. F was defined as
The second reward schedule was the equal-probability reward schedule (EPRS). In EPRS trials the monkeys were rewarded with 50% probability, no matter whether they reached for the direct or inferred goal, and regardless of the reward history. The reward probabilities for direct (R d ) or inferred (R i ) choices were
With the EPRS, the reward probability is independent of the behavioral strategy of the monkeys, as long as they chose between the two potential goals (see Figure S5 for data with 100% reward probability).
Biased and Balanced Condition
The recorded data was split into two distinct data sets. One data set contains only units that were recorded with the EPRS, before we trained the respective monkey with the BMRS. Since both monkeys showed a very similar choice bias during EPRS sessions (see Results), we refer to this data as the biased data set. The second data set contains only units recorded after we used BMRS and is referred to as balanced data set. Behavioral tests with the PMG-NC trials were conducted at the end of the neuronal recording period in the biased data set. Control experiments with simultaneous behavioral and neural recording of biased PMG-NC trials confirmed that results and conclusions are unaffected by this (see Figure S5 ).
Animal Preparation, Neural Recordings
Surgical procedures and neural recordings were described previously (Gail et al., 2009) . Animal care and all experimental procedures were conducted in accordance with German laws governing animal care.
Neural Data Selection and Tuning Analyses
Extracellular recordings were conducted with up to five microelectrodes in parallel (''mini-matrix''; Thomas Recording, Giessen, Germany) on each chamber. Spike times and waveforms were recorded and subjected to additional offline sorting (Offline Sorter; Plexon).
All isolated units were tested for their directional selectivity (Kruskal-Wallis test; four groups of different spatial cue positions; sample sizes defined by the number of identical trial repetitions). Selectivity was tested independently for direct-cued and inferred-cued trials during the late memory period in the DMG task (average spike rate during the last 300 ms of the memory period, i.e., activity succeeding the precue with a time-lag of at least 500 ms, and immediately preceding the GO cue). The late memory period was chosen to extract movement planning activity without confounding effects of (1) immediate visual input from the cue stimuli; (2) transition phases from visual to motor-goal tuning (Gail and Andersen, 2006) ; or (3) visual and somatosensory input and motor-control signals related to movement initiation.
Only neurons that were significantly selective in direct-cued trials of the DMG task were used in the following analyses ( Figure S6 ). For all analyses that involved PMG-CI or PMG-NC trials, we additionally required the neurons to be significantly directionally selective in the late memory period of PMG trials (Kruskal-Wallis, see above).
Population Activity
To visualize the temporal dynamics of spatial representations on a population level, we averaged the time-resolved spiking activity across all neurons that were directionally selective during the memory period of PMG trials. Before averaging, the directional selectivity profiles for each neuron were aligned relative to the interpolated preferred direction in the late memory period of the DMG task and normalized to the baseline level (average spike density in the 300 ms before spatial cue onset). The population activity was only used for illustrative purposes (see Figures 3C and 5C ), not for quantitative statistical analyses.
Analysis of Bimodal Selectivity Profiles
We used a direction modality contrast (DMC) to quantify the bimodality of individual neuronal responses:
R MD is the mean firing rate of a neuron during the last 300 ms of the memory period of all PMG trials (PMG-CI and PMG-NC) at the same direction that evoked the maximum response (MD) in the DMG task. R OD is the firing rate for trials in the opposite-to-maximum direction (OD). Since the MD is measured relative to the direction of the spatial cue in direct-cued trials of the DMG task, positive DMC indices indicate preferred selectivity for the direct motor goal (at the spatial cue location), whereas negative values indicate preferred selectivity for the inferred motor goal (opposite the spatial cue). Values around zero indicate symmetric bimodal selectivity, not lack of selectivity, since neurons without directional selectivity were removed from this analysis.
Choice-Selective Analyses
To differentiate between the selection and the preference hypotheses, we sorted the PMG-NC trials in the balanced data set according to the free choice of the monkey, and calculated the DMC separately for direct-choice and inferred-choice trials. That means if in a PMG-NC task the monkey reached toward a goal position as if the contextual instruction had been direct, the trial was labeled ''direct choice'' and if he reached toward a goal position as if the contextual instruction had been inferred, the trial was labeled ''inferred choice.'' The absolute choice-selective DMC values were then compared to the absolute original, choice-indifferent DMC values (average over all trials without sorting them according to the choice) in a similarity analysis (illustrated in Figure 4A ). The DMG condition was used as a control for this similarity analysis (see Figure S2) . To quantify the similarity between the choice-selective DMC values and the choice-indifferent DMC values, we calculated the distance from the unity line of the correlation plot, which is equivalent of calculating the difference between the choice-selective and choice-indifferent DMC values. We then used a t test to determine if the distribution of these differences was significantly deviating from zero.
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